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6

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MORRIS MYERS and
PEGGY A. MYERS,
PlaintiffsResponden ts,

Case No. 16991

v.
HOWARD R. MORGAN
and DAVID T. GREEN,
DefendantsAppellants.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs initiated this action on December 14, 1976,
for the balance due and owing on a Promissory Note dated
September 1, 1974.

The Promissory Note obligates Defendant

Howard R. Morgan to pay Peggy A. Myers Three Thousand Seven
Hundred Dollars ($3,700.00)

in monthly installments of One

Hundred Dollars ($100.00) per month.

Defendant David T. Green

did not sign the Note.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On May 31, 1979, Judge Banks heard the case and
entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against both
defendants in the amount of Two Thousand Five Hundred Forty
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Dollars ($2,540.000).

(Reporter's Transcript at 43.)

The sole

basis of defendant-appellant David T. Green's liability was
that Howard R. Morgan signed the Promissory Note as Green's
agent.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law).
On July 21, 1979, appellant filed a Motion for a New

Trial pursuant to Rule 59; a Motion to Amend or Alter the
Judgment under Rule 59; and a Motion for Relief from the
Judgment made under Rule 60.
A hearin~ was held on the Motions on November 14,
1979, where, as the Minute Entry indicates, the Court took the
matters under advisement.

On February 26, 1980, the Court

denied the Motions and made a Minute Entry to that effect.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to reverse the judgment entered by the
District Court against David T. Green.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs initiated this action for the balance due
on a Promissory Note dated September 1, 1974.

The Note,

however, was actually signed in March or April, 1975.
21).

(Tre

Howard Morgan signed the Note at the residence of the

plaintiffs.

Defendant David Green was not present at the

execution and did not sign the Note.

(Tr. 13).

Under the terms of the Note, defendant Morgan agreed
to pay Peggy Myers $3,700 in monthly installments.

Subsequent
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~

to the execution of the Note, Peggy Myers assigned one-half of
her interest in the Note to Morris Myers.

Morris Myers later

assigned that interest to P. J. Pagores.
On June 11, 1979, the Third Judicial District Court
entered a judgment against the defendants for the balance due
on the Note.

In its Findings of Fact, the Court found:

* * *
5.
Plaintiffs are the owners and holders
of said Promissory Note.
6.
Defendants failed to pay the
installments on said Promissory Note .
7.
On May 31, 1979, the principal balance
remaining due on said Promissory Note is
$2,540.00

* * *
9.
Said Promissory Note is a valid and
subsisting obligation on the part of defendants,
individually and as partners • . • .
ARGUMENT
I.

The Evidence at Trial was Insufficient
to Support a Judgment Against Appellant
David Green
A.

The Judgment from which relief is sought is a

Judgment on a Promissory Note.

The Third District Court's

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law states that:
3.
Defendant, Howard R. Morgan, individually
and for said partnership, and as agent of
defendant, David T. Green, a partner, made,
executed and delivered to plaintiff, Peggy A.

-3-
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Myers, the Promissory Note received in evidence
at the trial of this cause in consideration of
loans and advances made to said partnership by
plaintiffse •
5

•

6. Defendants failed to pay the installments
due on said Promissory Note when due so that the
balance due on said Note is immediately due and
payable . . . . .,
9.. Said Promissory Note is a valid and
subsisting obligation on the part of defendants,
individually and as partners aforesaid, to pay
to plaintiffs said principal sum and interest.
It is thus clear that the Court below held appellant liable to
plaintiffs on the theory that appellant was obligated under the
Promissory Note introduced into evidence.
B$

A party is not liable on any instrument

unless his name appears on the face of it.

Section

70A-3-401(1) of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code provides:
SIGNATURE -- (1)
No person is liable on an
instrument unless his signature appears thereon.
This basic principle has been adopted, without exception, by
every court considering the question.
Bank & Trust Co., 249 S.2d 55

(Fla~

Fewox v. Tallahassee

1971); Jennaro v. Jennaro,

190 N.W.2d 164 (Wise 1971); Ness v. Greater Arizona Realty
Inc., 517 P.2d 1278 (Ariz. 1974); Bostwick Banking Co. v.
Arnold, 178 S.E.2d 890 (Ga. 1970); Wiebke v. Richardson & Sons
Inc.,, 265 N.W.2d 571 (Wis. 1978); Havatampa Corp. v. Walton
Drug Co. Inc., 354 S.2d 1235 (Fla. 1978).

See, also, 11 AM JUR

2d, Bills and Notes, § 560.
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Ness v. Greater Arizona Realty Inc., supra,

is

representative of this authority and is particularly
significant since it arises out of a fact situation remarkably
similar to the present case.

In Ness, the plaintiff brought an

action against Louise Ness, Ness Investment Company, Ness
Finance Company and others for the balance due on a Promissorv
Note.

The Complaint alleged that Berth Ness, acting as agent,

and on behalf of the defendants, made, executed and delivered
to plaintiff a Promissory Note.
name on the Note.

Berth Ness' name was the only

Plaintiff filed the Complaint and obtained

service of process on the defendants.

Subsequently, default

judgments were rendered by the Court.

The defendants moved the

court to vacate the default but the trial court denied the
motions.

In reversing this ruling, the appellate court held

that the defendants could not be liable on the Note, since they
did not sign it:
Nowhere in Appellee's [plaintiff's]
complaint does it appear that the names of
appellants appeared on the Note. Nor is it
alleged that the Note in any way discloses that
Berth Ness signed in any capacity other than
that for himself individually.
A suit may not
be maintained or judgment obtained on a
promissory note against an undisclosed principle
whose signature does not appear thereon.
Richards v. Warnekros, 14 Ariz. 488, 131 P. 154
(1914); Plain State Bank v. Ellis, 174 Kansas
653, 258 P.2d 313 (1953).
See also, 11 AM JUR
2d, bills and Notes, § 560.
Id. at 1279 (emphasis added).
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The appellate court in Ness, supra, emphasized that
this rule applied even though the payee on the Note knew that
the Note was an obligation of a nonsigning party.

The court

observed:
The Official Comment found in Uniform Laws
Annotated, Uniform Commercial Code, § 3-401
provides:
"(l) no person is liable on an
instrument unless and until he has signed it.
The chief application of the rule has been in
cases holding that a principal whose name does
not appear on an instrument sigqed by his agent
is not liable on the instrument even though the
payee knew when it was issued that it was
intended to be an obligation of one who did not
sign .
n
(emphasis added)
Id .. at p. 1280
Co

An agent is personally liable on an

instrument if he does not name the principal he represents or
show that he signed in a representative capacity.

The

corollary to Section ?OA-3-401 of the Uniform Commercial Code
is found in Section 70A-3-403(2) which provides:
An authorized representative who signs his
own name to an instrument (a) is personally
obligated if the instrument neither names the
person represented nor shows that the
representative signed in a representative
capacity.
(emphasis added)
This principle has also been universally adopted by the
courts.

Wolfe v. University National Bank, 310 A.2d 558 (Md.

1973); North Carolina National Bank v. Wallens, 230 S.E.2d 690
(N.C. 1976); Ness v. Greater Arizona Realty Inc., 517 P.2d 1278
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(Ariz. 1974).

The court's decision in Wolfe, supra, has an

excellent application of this principle.

In that case, the

defendant Wolfe was a general partner in Watkins Glen Ltd.

The

partnership opened an account with the bank and entered into an
agreement that checks were to be signed by Wolfe, Holtze and
Altman.

Later the agreement was changed to require that the

checks be signed by either (a) Wolfe and Holtze or (b) Wolfe
and Waymoth.
Subsequently, 37 checks were drawn on the account,
each check bearing only one signature.

Relying on Section

3-401-(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code, the court held that
the partnership was not liable for the checks, even though it
was a partnership obligation.
Watkins Glen's signature was comprised of two
individual signatures as provided for in its
contract with the bank. Consequently, since
Watkins Glen's signature did not appear on any
of the 37 checks in question, the partnership
cannot be held liable on them, . . .
Id. at p. 560.
D.

Parol evidence is not admissible to show that

a party signed in a representative capacity.

Under Section

70A-3-401 of the Uniform Commercial Code a party is not liable
for an instrument that he did not sign.

To be liable on the

instrument, his agent must identify the principal or otherwise
show that he signed in a respresentative capacity.

However, as
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Section 70A-3-403 indicates, if the agent does not do so, the
agent is personally liable and there is not liability on the
part of the principal.

Further, parol evidence is inadmissible

to establish the principal's liability or to otherwise alter
the clear terms of the instrument.

Trenton Trust Co. v.

Klausman, 296 A.2d 275 (Pa. 1972); Bostwick Banking Co. v.
Arnold, 178 S.E.2d 890 (Gae 1970); J. P. Sivertson and Co. v.
Lolmaugh, 380

N~E.2d

520 (Ill. 1978).

The court in Bostwick

explains the principle this way:
One who executes a note in his own name
with nothing on the face of the note showing his
agency cannot introduce parol evidence to show
that he executed it for a principal, or that the
payee knew that he intended to execute it as
agent.
A court may take judicial notice
that the signature of an inidividual on the face
of a note, at the bottom on the right, without
limiting or descriptive words before or after
TI, is the universal method of signing a
contract to assume a personal obligation.
e

•

•

It is well established . . . that parol evidence
is not admissible to add to, take from or vary
the terms of an unambiguous written contract.
[citations omitted]
Under the Uniform
Commercial Code enacted in Georgia in 1962, 'An
authorized representative who signs his own name
to an instrument . . • is personally obligated
if the instrument neither names the person
represented nor shows that the representative
signed in a representative capacity.'
[citations omitted]
Even though the instrument
may name the person represented, the one who
signs in a representative capacity may still be
personally liable on the instrument if by his

-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

manner of signing he does not clearly inrlicate
that he is signing in a representative capacity
or if the instrument does not name the 00rson
represented but does show that the sign~r
thereof signed in a representative capacity.
Id. at 893-894 (emphasis added).
When there is an ambiguity appearing on the face of
the document, parol evidence is admissible to determine the
intent.

However, the Code makes it clear that there is no

ambiguity when a party signs an instrument without adding any
description or indication that he is acting in the capacity of
an agent.

Therefore, parol evidence is inadmissible.

Trenton

Trust Co. v. Klausman, 296 A.2d 275 (Pa. 1972): J. P. Sivertson
& Co. v. Lolmaugh, 380 N.E.2d 520 (Ill. 1978).

The court in

Lolmaugh explains:
If there is a question as to whether or not
a person signed as an individual or as an agent
for a principal, parol evidence is admissible
if, and only if, two criteria are met.
First
the action must be between the immediate parties
to the Note.l Secondly, there must be some
indication of the existence of a principal or
that the signator signed in a representative
capacity.

lrt is interesting to Note that this proceeding is not
between the immediate parties to the Promissory Note.
Morris
Myers was not a party to the September 4, 1974, ~ote.
His
interest arises by way of assignment.
In Wood Press, Inc. v.
Eisen, 384 A.2d 538 (N.J. 1978), the court held that a holder
in due course of the Note, was not an immediate party and
therefore not entitled to rely on parol evidence.
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Id.

at 522.
From the foregoing, then, it can be concluded that

Green is liable on the September 1, 1974, Note only if (a) he
personally signed it; or (b) Howard Morgan signed it and
indicated on the face of the instrument that Green was his
principal and that Morgan was signing in a representative
capacity.
liable.

If Morgan only signed his name, Morgan is personally
Parol evidence is inadmissible to establish that

Morgan was signing for some one elseo
E.

Appellant David Green is not liable as a

party to the September 4, 1974, instrument because he did not
sign it.

The signator, Howard Morgan, alone is personally

liable on the Note.

The plaintiffs in this case have brought

an action on a Promissory Note dated September 1, 1974.

The

sole claim for relief is the purported liability on the
instrument.

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in

this case clearly indicate that Green's liability is limited to
his liability as a party to the instrument.

As previously

discussed, this Note is, as a matter of law, not sufficient to
impose any liability on David

Green~

Reference is made again

to Ness v. Greater Arizona Realty, Inc., supra.
In Ness v. Greater Arizona Realty, Inc., the plaintiff
filed a Complaint on a promissory note against a nonsigner to
the note.

An examination of the Complaint in that case and the
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Complaint filed in this case demonstrate they arc virtua11y
identical:
Ness

Myers v. Green

That at all times
complained of herein, Berth
C. Ness was acting as agent
of and with the full authority
to bind the defendants and each
of them in connection with all
complained of herein . .

2. That at the time of
the loans and advances hereinabove mentioned defendants
engaged in business as a
partnership doing business
under the firm name and style
of MGM Personnel Associates.

That prior to the
commencement of this action,
Berth C. Ness acting for and
on behalf of the defendants
and each of them, made and
delivered a promissory note
dated the 15th day of May,
1969, in the sum of $25,000
to the order of the plaintiff.

3.
Defendant, Howard R.
Morgan, individually and for
said partnership, and as
agent of defendant, David T.
Green, a partner, made,
executed and delivered to
Peggy A. Myers, a Promissory
Note.

The court in Ness held that the nonsigning parties were not
liable because they did not

sig~

the instrument.

The court did

indicate however, that plaintiffs "could have sued defendants
on the underlying obligation for which the note was given, but
this was not done."

Id. at 1279.

In the present case, defendant-appellant David T. Green
may have had similar liability, but plaintiffs did not sue on
the obligation underlying the

~ote.

Like Ness, plaintiffs-

respondents' suit was brought and judgment was entered on the
Note.

Therefore, Green cannot, as the Uniform Commercial Code

indicates, be liable.
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Plaintiffs-respondents have not challenged the validity
of the rules provided in the Uniform Commercial Code.

They do

not argue that the Code does not mean what it says or even
suggest that the case law interpreting the Code is incorrect.
Rather respondents allege that Green is liable because Morgan
signed the instrument in a representative capacity, was Green's
partner, and is therefore liable on the instrument under common
agency principals.

However, as previously discussed,

(1)

Howard Morgan did not sign the Note in a representative
capacity;

(2) since there is no ambiguity in his signature,

parol evidence is inadmissible to establish that he was signing
in a representative capacity, and (3)

therefore, David T. Green

is not liable on the instrument.
F.

The Judgment entered below ignores the

essential distinction between a negotiable Note and an
underlying obligation.

It is important to emphasize that the

Code does not prevent the payee of an instrument from
collecting from a nonsigner in a proceeding based upon the
obligation underlying the Note.

Wiebke v. Richardson, 265

N.W.2d 571 {Wis. 1978); Ness v. Greater Arizona Realty, Inc.,
supra; Mcclung v. Saito, 4 Cal. App. 3d 143, 84 Cal. Rptr. 44
(1970); Potts v. First City Bank, 86 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1970).
The court in Saito Notes the distinction this way:
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The fact that they (the defendantsl had not
signed the Note did not relieve them of their
obligation to repay the consideration given for
it.
The law distinguishes between an action on
a promissory note and an action to recover the
consideration for which it was given
(emphasis
added).
Respondents have failed to Note this obvious
distinction.

However, the cases cited in respondents' prior

briefs clearly observe it, and by no stretch of the imagination
do they stand for the proposition that David T. Green is liable
on the September 1, 1975 instrument.

In Salt Lake City Brewinq

Co. v. Hawke, 66 P. 1058 (Utah 1901), the plaintiff brought an
action to recover money loaned and for goods sold and
delivered.
claim.-

It is important to emphasize the basis of the

The plaintiff applied, by a letter to the plaintiff,

for a One Thousand Dollar ($1,000.00) loan.

In a second

letter, he applied for an additional Five Hundred Dollars
($500.00)

and made an order for goods.

While the subsequent

passage of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code would invalidate
any contrary holding or dicta in Hawke, the action brought in
Hawke was not on a negotiable instrument, but rather for the
obligation to pay for goods received and for money lent.

The

Utah Supreme Court held that the defendant could obligate the
partnership for partnership obligations:
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When, therefore, . . . money is borrowed by
one member of a firm on the credit of the firm,
according to the usual course of its business,
and within the general scope of its authority,
the partnership is liable therefore.
Id. at 1060.
Clearly, as in Hawke,

a signing partner to a sales

contract can create a partnerhip obligation, or he can create
an obligation to a nonsigning partner.

However, that liability

is based on the obligation, for the benefit received.

Neither

Hawke, nor any other case has held that a nonsigning partner
can be obligated on an instrument he does not sign, when his
agency does not appear on the face of the instrument.
The case of Mccollum v. Steitz, 67 Cal. Rptr. 703
(1968)

is a perfect example of this.

There the court held that

a nonsigning partner could be held liable on a Note signed by
his partner.

However, his partner signed the Note and inserted

the firm name and address after the signature.

This is

obviously a different situation from the present case, where
Howard Morgan signed his name without any indication of
agency.

It should also be Noted that Steitz also recognized

the principle that parol evidence is admissible to determine
agency only if there is a patent ambiguity on the face of the
document.
Respondents have also relied on North Carolina
National Bank v. Wallens, 230 S.E.2d 690 (N.C. 1976).
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In

Wallens,

the bank had brought an action against partners

un~0r

an agreement wherein the defendants agreed in July of 1970 to
guarantee and assume all future liabilities for debts of the
partnership.

Later in March, 1973, one of the partners

borrowed money from the plaintiff and signed a Promissory
Note.

The Note was merely signed by G. C. Wallens.

Neither

the partnership name nor the name of the other partner was on
the Note.

On a Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court,

relying on Section 3-401(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code
found that the partnership was not liable on the Note.

The

appellate. court reversed this determination and held that
although the Note was not enforceable, the guarantee agreement
(the underlying obligation) was enforceable against the
partnership.

The court emphasized that the partnership was not

on the Note:
Defendant's potential liability had to be based
on something other than that of a party to the
note. That a nonsigner is ordinarily not liable
'Orl"an instrument which he had not signed, 'does
not mean that a nonsigner may not be liable
under some other principle of law.
It only
means that the liability of the nonsigner is not
as a party to the instrument.
Id. at 692 (emphasis added).
It is clear then, that under the Code, Green is not
liable on the September 1, 1974 Note unless he signed it or
unless Morgan signed it in a representative capacity.

That
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capacity, moreover, must appear on the face of the Note.
evidence is inadmissible to establish such capacity.

Parol

The cases

cited by both Green and the plaintiffs support these basic
principles.

Defendant Green has been unable to find a single

case which holds otherwise.
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